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Georgetown Journal on Poverty Law and Policy
Volume XXVII, Number 2, Winter 2020

Panel Presented by the Georgetown University Law
Center’s Supreme Court Institute
Olmstead v. L.C.: The Supreme Court Case
Samuel Bagenstos, Irv Gornstein,
Michael Gottesman, and Jennifer Mathis*
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS (MODERATOR): I'm really thrilled to be the moderator
on this panel about the Olmstead case.
You have an incredible luxury here at Georgetown Law. You have faculty who
are engaged in the world like two of my colleagues on this panel. To my immediate
left is Professor Michael Gottesman (Georgetown University Law Center) who
argued the case on behalf of Lois and Elaine, and to my next far left, Professor Irv
Gornstein (Georgetown University Law Center) who argued the case on behalf of
the United States. Between them is Jennifer Mathis (The Bazelon Center for
Mental Health Law) who has spent, I think, most of her career at the Bazelon
Center litigating, and organizing, and helping to coordinate folks on Olmsteadrelated issues. She played an important role in this case as it proceeded to the
Supreme Court.
I'm not going to say much in this panel. My goal is to hear from the folks who
were deeply involved in this case. It was a huge case at the time. I went to the
argument and benefited a lot from watching the argument. But these are three
people from whom I have learned a lot throughout my career. And I hope to give
you all the benefit of their wisdom, so I am mostly going to ask them questions.
To situate the Olmstead case in the history of the law surrounding mental
health, disability, and institutionalization: Olmstead1 was decided in 1999, nine
years after the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) was adopted. It was decided
around the same time the Supreme Court was starting to hear a bunch of cases
involving the ADA. The ADA was adopted in 1990. The Supreme Court heard no
cases on the statute until 1998, and then heard a succession of ADA cases over the
next several years. Most of those cases turned out badly for the disability rights
movement. Then Olmstead came to the Supreme Court.
When you listen to the arguments or read the briefs, at the Supreme Court the
question in Olmstead is: What does disability discrimination mean? How is
*Samuel Bagenstos is the Frank G. Millard Professor of Law at the University of Michigan Law
School. Irv Gornstein is a Professor of Law and Executive Director of the Supreme Court Institute at the
Georgetown Law Center. Michael Gottesman is Michael Gottesman is a Professor of Law at Georgetown
University Law Center. He has argued many cases in the U.S. Supreme Court, including the Olmstead case
on behalf of the plaintiffs. Jennifer Mathis is the Director of Policy and Legal Advocacy at the Judge David
L. Bazelon Center for Mental Health Law. The Bazelon Center is a national non-profit legal advocacy
organization that advances the rights of individuals with mental disabilities.
1. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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institutionalization understood as discrimination? Those are the issues that really
motivated the justices when they were deciding the case, if you go by the way the
opinions were written and the way the questions at oral argument went.
If you think about Olmstead in terms of its effect on the world, though, I think
the best way of thinking about it was as marking a new era of deinstitutionalization
litigation. In the 60’s, and most of the 70’s and 80’s, this area of litigation was
really focused on constitutional challenges to institutionalization. These cases
rested on negative rights kinds of arguments, mostly under the Due Process Clause.
The argument was that if states are locking people up, they ought to do some things
for the folks they are locking up. The litigators thought that if they won these cases,
the courts’ rulings would impose pressure on states to move people into highquality community systems. It would be too expensive to satisfy the constitutional
requirements otherwise.
This was a largely successful strategy in terms of moving people out of large
state-operated institutions both in the developmental disability and the mental
health worlds, and it was a largely unsuccessful strategy in terms of promoting
high-quality community services around the country. Of course, the fact that this
litigation overlaps with the rise of property tax revolts, and then Reaganism, et
cetera, had something to do with it. Also, the structure of a negative rights claim
had something to do with it. If the claim is “you can't lock someone up without
doing something for them,” then the state can say “Ok, great. We won't lock them
up, and we won't do anything for them.”
So Olmstead in my view represents the beginning of a different kind of
strategy toward institutionalization, which is to say, you have to do it in a way that
is providing services in the most integrated setting. That new strategy created a
bunch of levers for expanding community-based services. I hope by the end we get
into some of that.
But I want to begin by talking about where the case came from. So, Jennifer,
this is the issue you have focused on for most of your career. Once the ADA was
adopted, how were the folks in the national disability rights community thinking
about the ADA as a potential tool in the deinstitutionalization?
JENNIFER MATHIS: As you alluded to, we had a long history of people trying
to get at deinstitutionalization in other ways. We had the Pennhurst case2 that went
up to the Supreme Court. The Pennhurst case involved the Developmental
Disabilities Assistance and Bill of Rights Act,3 which had language that basically
said that “thou shalt serve people with intellectual and developmental disabilities
in the least restrictive setting” and the Supreme Court said “Congress didn’t really
mean that you have to do that. That language is merely aspirational; it’s precatory
words.” 4 And then there were a series of due process cases challenging the
conditions of institutional confinement, some of which were aiming at ultimately
getting people out of institutions, closing down institutions and getting people in
the community, but they weren’t addressing what the community system looks
like.
2. Pennhurst St. Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 15001 et seq. (2000).
4. Quotations in this sentence are Mathis’ paraphrasing of the laws; neither is a direct quote from the
Act or a Supreme Court opinion.
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With the ADA, I think people were certainly thinking about these issues from
the beginning. There were some old 504 cases where people had tried to argue that
Section 5045 had an integration mandate; in fact, including the Pennhurst case,
which was brought in the 1970s. David Ferleger brought this case6 with DD Act
claims that also included constitutional claims and 504 claims that were based on
the integration mandate. So, it was certainly something that people were thinking
about. After the ADA was enacted, we started to see some litigation that was
brought under both the ADA and constitutional claims. People didn’t give up on
bringing those constitutional claims for a long time. I think at some point, it
became clear that the ADA would be a better vehicle and you saw that the
constitutional claims really drop off.
In 1991, Tim Cook wrote an article 7 that set out a vision of the ADA’s
integration mandate. Tim Cook was a former Justice Department lawyer and
colleague of Bob Dinerstein’s, who very publicly resigned from the Justice
Department. The article laid out some thinking about the integration mandate and
how it might apply under the ADA.
And then you had some early cases starting with Helen L.,8 which I think was
the case that launched a thousand Olmstead cases. It came out of Pennsylvania.
We would rarely see this today, but Helen L. involved several different plaintiffs
who were in different types of institutions. Actually, the first plaintiff was someone
in a psychiatric hospital, and then plaintiffs added who were at nursing homes who
had physical disabilities, and it was brought by Steve Gold and the Pennsylvania
Protection and Advocacy System. They got a good decision from the Third Circuit
in 1995. And then the Supreme Court denied cert in 1995. I think seeing that case
and seeing a court say for the first time that it’s a form of disability discrimination
under the ADA to needlessly institutionalize people with disabilities started a tide.
A bunch of other folks and organizations around the country tried to bring
similar cases. One of those was Atlanta Legal Aid. Sue Jamieson, who came to
Atlanta Legal Aid shortly before then, was very focused on institutional advocacy
and making institutions better, but particularly getting people out of institutions
rather than improving their conditions. Mostly she was trying to figure out how to
get people out and they had brought some individual cases with constitutional
theories.
Then Steve Caley, the legal director at Atlanta Legal Aid, said, “let's do one
of these Helen L. cases.” He found Lois Curtis and later found Elaine Wilson in
one of the Georgia state psychiatric hospitals. Both Lois and Elaine had intellectual
disabilities and psychiatric disabilities and Georgia State psychiatric hospitals
treated both systems. So, they were actually sort of a test case, with the cleanest
possible sets of facts. They were looking for folks where there was no dispute that
they were ready for discharge, and their treatment teams and doctors agreed that
they were appropriate for community services, meaning that the only reason they
5. 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2015).
6. Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1312 (E.D. Pa. 1977), aff’d in part
and rev’d in part, 612 F.2d 84 (3d Cir. 1979), rev’d, 451 U.S. 1 (1981), judgment reinstated on other
grounds on remand, 673 F.2d 647 (3d Cir. 1982), rev’d, 465 U.S. 89 (1984).
7. Timothy M. Cook, The Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 TEMP. L.R.
393 (1991).
8. Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325 (3d Cir. 1995).
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were sitting in the hospital—in Lois's case for maybe two, or two and a half years
past when she was deemed by the treatment team as ready to leave—was that the
state didn't have enough community services. She just had to wait. Elaine’s case
was similar in that she was waiting over a year.
That is really how Olmstead got started. They brought that case and it ended
up in the Eleventh Circuit. And they got a good decision there as well, similar to
Helen L. The decision is a little different from what the Supreme Court did. The
Eleventh Circuit decision has a different cost defense. It does have some cost
defense in its analysis, but it doesn’t look at the whole system the way Olmstead
would and doesn’t have a defense where the remedy would fundamentally alter the
state service system. The Eleventh Circuit was looking at the cost, and they were
looking at fundamental alteration, but the way that they analyzed it was looking at
the cost to serve the person in the community versus the cost to serve the person
in the institution. Period. And so, they did a different analysis than the Supreme
Court.
So that is how we ended up with Olmstead in the Supreme Court. I think the
disability rights legal community wasn’t that focused on that particular case
because there were few of these cases that had been decided and nobody expected
this to get taken by the Supreme Court that early. The Bazelon Center was involved
in the Eleventh Circuit briefing and everybody ended up getting involved as soon
as the Court took cert. Cert was granted in December 1998 and I came to The
Bazelon Center in January 1999, and I spent my first six months working just on
Olmstead. That was the time of the emergence of the disability rights community’s
focus in a more coordinated way on this issue.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: When the disability community started to focus on the
issue, after cert was granted, what was the goal of the disability rights community
at that point? Obviously, there was this case, they had lawyers, what were all the
other lawyers who did disability rights work who focused on national issues
thinking was their role at this point?
JENNIFER MATHIS: Interestingly, I would say, there was as much focus on
coordinating with a grassroots effort as there was for devising a legal strategy. You
have to remember that this was before we had [email] list servs and communication
was not as easy as it is today. I looked through my files and I found that we were
sending letters and formal memos to people saying “would you talk with me about
this.” We had a very intensive coordination effort, which does not always happen
at the Supreme Court. Lots of times you have briefs where people have not talked
to others extensively before filing and they say the same or contradictory things. It
was a really impressive effort involving lots of different sectors of the disability
community and the legal community as well as the non-legal community including
the ADAPT9 folks, with Steve Gold's involvement too. We had particularly strong
communication between the grassroots activist community and the legal
community because Steve Gold was the institutional counsel for ADAPT (I don’t
mean institutional in the institution sense).
9. ADAPT is a national grassroots organization that coordinates activists to engage in nonviolent
protests related to disability rights. See ADAPT, www.adapt.org (last visited Feb. 21, 2020).
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But it was a really interesting addition to all of the legal briefs that were filed,
because there was a significant effort—and I'm not sure it's ever been paralleled
except possibly in the effort to fight the repeal of the Affordable Care Act and the
destruction of Medicaid—by state-based cross-disability coalitions that were
developed in every state. And they had a legal focus. You had people meeting with
states’ attorneys general. You had ADAPT folks chaining themselves to state
capitols. And you had whole different sets of folks trying to meet with attorneys
general, trying to meet with the governors to say two things: One was to withdraw
from the amicus brief filed by states supporting cert. When Georgia had sought
cert in the Supreme Court, there were twenty-two states that filed an amicus brief
saying, “oh my God, the sky is falling, the sky is falling, we could never do this.
We have very complex systems of healthcare. And it would just blow up the
systems if we had to suddenly, immediately discharge everybody into the
community. What would we do?”
They also argued that Medicaid was already the default system for all of these
health services and Medicaid is a separate law and has different flexibilities within
it. They said that is really the scheme that we need to follow: Medicaid says we
can have institutions and Medicaid says we can limit community services. And so,
interpreting this civil rights law in this broad way would be catastrophic, they said.
So with twenty-two states coming to the Supreme Court saying, “the sky is
falling, the sky is falling,” obviously people were very concerned about what
impact that would have on the Court. So, part of the grassroots effort was to get
states to withdraw from the Georgia brief.
I never really saw that done in another case in the same way. Ultimately fifteen
of the twenty-two states sent notices saying, “We withdraw ourselves from this
brief.” And then there was an effort to try to get the states to remain neutral on the
merits, and not join one of these briefs from the states that said the sky is falling.
That was a stunning effort on a grassroots level.
For the legal briefs filed, we had former commissioners and mental health
commissioners and intellectual disability service commissioners. We had Dick
Thornburgh, who had been the attorney general when the ADA regulations were
adopted. We had ADAPT and TASH 10 and NCIL (National Council on
Independent Living) and we had the National Council on Disability which had
been part of developing a blueprint for the ADA in the first place. And we had a
variety of other groups, and it was a really well-coordinated effort. The former
Commissioners were saying, “Hey, it doesn't cost what you think. It's actually
cheaper to serve folks in the community than it is to serve people in institutional
settings for the most part. This is where the field is going.” And the advocates were
saying, “Community integration is good. And here is what it means to us.”
There was a mental health consumers group, as it was called then, filing a brief
with individual stories, doing the story telling of how their lives had changed since
they got out of being hospitalized and started living in their own homes. In some
cases, they lived in group homes, but a lot of them lived in their own homes.
There were some interesting fights about the amicus strategy. For example,
Steve Gold said the briefs need to talk about people in nursing homes or the Court
10. “TASH” was previously an acronym for “The Association for Persons with Severe Handicaps,”
but the group discontinued use of the full name and now uses only the abbreviation.
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will not address the folks in nursing homes who don’t need to be there. Others
raised concerns that this would highlight the potential breadth of the integration
mandate in unhelpful ways. In the end, ADAPT filed its own brief talking about
nursing homes, but did not highlight the application of the integration mandate to
older people in nursing homes. At the time it was less understood that many
younger people with disabilities were in nursing homes. Reading the brief, judges
weren’t necessarily thinking about the large number of older folks in nursing
homes and the Olmstead implications of that.
I also remember getting calls from someone in the mental health community
saying, “We understand there is this consumer brief.” There were lots of politics
in the mental health community about the term “consumer” and many people don’t
like it and prefer other terminology. This caller objected to the term and said if you
get this brief filed that says it’s on behalf of “consumers,” then we are going to file
2,000 amicus briefs on behalf of 2,000 people in nursing homes, and then no one
is going to read anything. So, there were a lot of interesting fights about what might
be considered tangential issues, but it was really a massive coordination effort both
on the level of people filing the legal briefs but also the people doing all the
grassroots strategy, which truly made all the difference in the world.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: And you are the person who brought Mike Gottesman
into the case.
JENNIFER MATHIS: The Bazelon Center was trying to identify a Supreme Court
litigator. That is a strategy the disability community has employed when some
ADA cases have gone up to the Supreme Court, but sometimes that is a battle
because the people who have been working on a case are very attached to the case,
and they have worked on it for a long time. If it gets taken by the Supreme Court
they want to do the argument; it’s not that often that they would get to do a
Supreme Court argument. For that reason, it's often very difficult for people to
agree to give that up.
But in the case of Olmstead, Steve Caley, the Atlanta Legal Aid Litigation
Director, said, “Absolutely,” and totally was on board with the idea that we needed
somebody who understood the Supreme Court. We needed someone who was
focused on how each justice thinks and what their history has been and what
motivates them. Mike Gottesman had been my colleague Mary Giliberti’s law
professor; he had been my law professor; and I think at the time he had done
seventeen arguments in the Supreme Court and won most or all of them. Which is
a stunning record. We—Mary and I—reached out to Mike. And I think I wrote
fifty memos for Mike in the next couple of months.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: Mike, let’s turn to you. You had not been a disability
lawyer before. Most of your cases had either been labor or tort cases. When you
saw this case, how did you think about it? How did you think about what the issues
would be in the case, and how did you approach it?
MICHAEL GOTTESMAN: You are absolutely right, I had never been involved
with the mental health community, or any of the issues or the litigation that Jennifer
has described. I did have some familiarity with the ADA, because Title I deals with
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discrimination in employment and I was primarily an employment lawyer, so I had
filed briefs in a lot of cases involving that. But the issues that are posed in the
Olmstead case are unlike anything that arises under Title I of the ADA. This idea
that you are entitled to be in the most integrated setting just isn't a concept under
Title I. Discrimination under Title I is discrimination in the ordinary, general sense
and the way that three justices on the Supreme Court in Olmstead thought about
discrimination—that is, that you are being treated differently from another person
when the only difference between the two of you is that one of you is disabled.
My first thought when I got called by Jennifer to be involved in this and she
told me that she and Mary had persuaded others that I should be involved, was
what a reversal of roles this was: that we as professors are always trying to find
jobs for our students, and here the students were finding a job for me!
And the second thing I thought was that this was an area I knew nothing about.
Yes, I knew about the Supreme Court and how to argue cases there. But I didn’t
know the subject matter that was going to be the crux of this case. And here, as
Jennifer described, not only was there a reversal of roles in getting jobs, there was
also a role reversal in teaching. Jennifer taught me all about Title II and the ADA
and the entire history that she has just described of litigation in this area. As I
learned more and thought about this more, it seemed to me that the one and only
issue that the state of Georgia was asking the Supreme Court to decide was whether
it is discrimination to keep people in institutions rather than in the community.
Georgia’s argument was that to have discrimination, you have to have two people,
two like people, who are being treated differently, only because of disability.
And there was an attenuated argument that we were able to come up with that,
even under that definition, this would be a violation. But that wasn't going to be
the main line of the argument. It was clear when you read this statute on its face
and when you read the legislative history of it that Congress had very much in
mind that keeping people unnecessarily in institutions and depriving them of
getting their treatment in the most integrated setting, we will declare that itself is
discrimination. Never mind what we normally think about discrimination, never
mind the normal meaning of those words—this is a statute that is saying that is
discrimination. So that was the centerpiece of our argument. And if you asked what
my expectations were, I thought it was likely we would get five justices who would
embrace that view.
In the actual drafting of the brief, there were a number of points to be made.
Number one: On the face of the statute, Congress made several findings. First, the
finding that there is segregation that is unnecessary, that institutionalization of
people who don't need to be institutionalized is unacceptable.
And then another thing was in the statute. The Rehabilitation Act was passed
before the ADA was enacted. Congress directed the Justice Department to develop
regulations under Title II of the ADA and in doing so, to incorporate the
regulations that had been adopted under the Rehabilitation Act. And one of those
regulations was the integration regulation saying that you can't keep people
unnecessarily segregated when they could be served in the community. So the
nature of our brief was largely to look at the face of the statute.
Even more importantly, Congress directed the Justice Department to adopt this
regulation. It’s not like the Justice Department on its own was thinking, “Would
this be a good idea? Is this what the statute means?” Congress told them to adopt
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this regulation. That's why I felt pretty confident that we could establish that this
was discrimination within the meaning of the ADA.
I was struck by the fact that, when I read over the briefs in anticipation of being
here today, my argument and Irv Gornstein’s brief for the government were
essentially identical on this issue, and we had not consulted with each other. The
analysis was quite clear as to why this should have been discrimination under the
ADA, so that wasn't what the concern was. I think the concern we all recognized
was, will the Supreme Court be concerned about the burdens that this will put on
the state? Are the states up to it? What will this mean? The statute and the
regulations that the Justice Department promulgated did include a defense for
states. The accommodations had to be reasonable. But more importantly, they said
that nothing that would require a “fundamental alteration” of the state services
would be required. So that seemed to us to be a very big issue.
But that was not the issue that Georgia had asked the Supreme Court to decide.
When you file a cert petition, you have questions presented. The only question they
presented was: Was it discrimination? They didn't present an issue about what the
remedy should be or what would be a fundamental alteration. Nonetheless, we
knew that even though the Court wasn't being asked to address that issue, they
were probably going to want to know what the answer to that issue was before they
would be prepared to pull the plug and say “yes, [this is discrimination].” They
weren’t going to want to unleash this fury without any idea what the impact on the
states would be.
Inevitably we had to brief the question, “Under what circumstances will the
state have a defense that says this is too much, we can't do it”? The literature at
that point was absolutely clear that it's cheaper to serve people, when they’re up to
it, in group settings in the community than it is to keep them in institutions. But
there was one problem. That assumed that you did not have to factor in the cost of
the state maintaining the institutions. The institutions were already there,
employees were already there. Assuming they were not going to close the
institutions because some people needed to be served in them, this was going to be
an add-on cost. So, there was that problem and the problem of whether the states
might respond with dumping into the community all the people who really needed
institutional care. If they had to move some of them to the community, why keep
others? Our principal argument on that, and here the Justice Department took a
slightly different tack, was that the solution was to close those institutions that you
don't need. The number of vacant spaces in the Georgia institutions at that time
should be such that they could have just closed down some of the institutions and
moved the people who needed to be there into the other institutions. But that of
course might not necessarily be true in every state, and the Supreme Court was
making a decision that would apply nationwide. So, that was a real problem to
address and I think the government spent more of their time on that so maybe they
were the ones to address that.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: I have been assigned to do the segue to Irv Gornstein
now. Irv, you were working in the Solicitor General’s (SG) office when Olmstead
came before the Court. Of course, you had been an appellate lawyer in the DOJ
Civil Rights Division for a number of years before that. And you had some
experience with civil rights laws and with the ADA. So how were you thinking
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about this case, and was it different from the way that Mike and Jennifer were
thinking?
IRV GORNSTEIN: The first thing I thought about the case was that we had
regulations on point so I knew we would be defending the regulations. That is sort
of a starting point. The second thing is that I knew I would be hearing from not
just the Civil Rights Division, but also the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS). That is typical in the Solicitor General’s office: You hear from
everybody who has an interest, and so, as far as possible, you try to accommodate
the interests of all parts of the government. Insofar as not, then the Solicitor
General (SG) has to make a call and you, as the Assistant, make a recommendation
and the SG makes the call if there is that kind of debate. So, the first thing you try
to do is hear from everybody and see if you can get agreement or consensus around
something. And so the Civil Rights Division had one perspective and HHS had a
slightly different one, because the HHS has Medicaid and so had quite a lot of
involvement in it, and so part of the task is to try to see how to get everybody to
come together on something that everybody can live with, even if they don't one
hundred percent embrace it.
And for me, my perspective after that was just how do I count to five? Unlike
Mike, I was not confident that we would get five justices; I was looking at two
justices only at the time, Justice O’Connor and Justice Breyer.
It's a different Court today than it was then. Now, people are used to talking
about the Chief Justice [Roberts] being like the median justice. For a long time,
Justice Kennedy was the median justice. But at that time, the median justice was
Justice O'Connor. And so, I thought that if I didn’t get Justice O'Connor, then we
were losing the case. I also worried about Justice Breyer because he is a very
practical man. Mike talked about the discrimination issue. I didn't worry about the
discrimination issue because I didn’t think my two target justices were going to
care about that much, as long as I gave them some kind of plausible story about
why it was discrimination, I thought that would be fine if you could satisfy them
about everything else. And we had more than a plausible story. Although I have to
tell you, every time before we did arguments in the Supreme Court, we would do
two moot courts and I did not get a single moot court justice to agree with me that
there was discrimination. So if you were not versed in the ADA and you did not
buy into the view that hey, Congress just decided to have a completely different
definition of discrimination here than in every other civil rights statute, then it was
a very tough uphill sled to convince you that there actually was discrimination. But
as I said, I never had any actual concern about that. We had a strong argument that
there was discrimination. But more than that, I knew that if I could satisfy Justice
O'Connor and Justice Breyer on things they would care about, then they would be
fine with the reading of the discrimination language.
To me, the big problems as I thought about the case were these: When one
walked around downtown D.C. at the time, one would see people who I thought
the justices would think belonged in institutions, not in community settings. One
might say: “I don’t want to see more of that.” So, one big concern that I had was
that they would fear that the consequence of ruling in favor of the integration
regulation would be that there would be a lot of people on the streets who seemed
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like they should not be on the streets. The second big concern I had was the one
that Mike discussed: How was this going to shake out for the states?
There were two things that we specifically did in the brief in an effort to deal
with those two problems. Justice O'Connor has a lot of concern about flexibility
for states and she also had concerns about disabled people getting the best
treatment possible. I knew she would want to address both of those concerns, so I
wanted to be able to serve up something that would allow her to do that, as well as
satisfy the concern I anticipated Justice Breyer would have about people being out
who shouldn’t be out.
So we had two issues: one was to what degree of deference should be given to
the state, to the person in the state who is recommending whether someone should
be in or out [of an institution.] I thought that unless there was some degree of
deference to that judgment, we would have trouble bringing Justice O'Connor
around. You could have debated that issue either way, but there was a 504 case
called Arline11 in which there was some measure of deference given. So, I thought,
“well that's number one what I want to do.”
The second thing that was a big issue was managing costs. As Mike said, if
you close down institutions or leave only one open and fill everybody in there, then
it would be cheaper in the long run. But in the short run, at least in some places,
HHS had advised us that there would be increased cost and could even be
substantial increased cost. So I knew the Court was going to hear that and I knew
we would need an answer for Justice O’Connor on that.
I can’t remember who came up with the idea first, me, HHS or the Civil Rights
Division, or whether we came up with it together, but there was this idea of a plan
that did not require everybody to be moved at once, but allowed the state to say,
“We have a plan for moving people who are found to be able to appropriately
benefit from community treatment and here is our plan and it's a reasonable plan
and making us switch from that would either be a fundamental alteration or it
would be an unreasonable modification of state policy.” That was the idea we
surfaced in the brief to help states manage their cost.
We thought that in the long run, that the costs are manageable and there will
be no justification for not moving almost everybody, eventually, into the
community. But we wanted to give the states a way to deal with the short-term
upticks in costs and other administrative concerns. There were some additional
practical concerns. For example, there were people in the institutions who were
employed, who would have to be fired eventually, and there definitely was going
to be a lot of resistance to that. So we thought as a practical matter it would be
good, and not damaging in the long run, if we proposed that states have a plan that
provides for prompt but still manageable movement of people who belong in the
community into the community, while still allowing people who needed
institutional treatment to remain.
I gather there is a sense today that nobody needs to be in an institution, but at
that time there was still somewhat of a consensus that some people needed
institutional treatment, and would be allowed to remain in an institution.
That was pretty much the brief. As I say, nobody in the SG’s office thought
we would win. They all thought we would lose. And I thought we were going to
11. See Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline, 480 U.S. 273 (1987).
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get, at most, five justices. It turned out we had five and a half because if you read
Justice Kennedy's opinion he was halfway there.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: It’s very interesting—and I think this says something
about the culture of the SG’s office—that the culture of the SG’s office is very
taken by formalist arguments. But you were making a very non-formalist
argument. You are telling a story about what discrimination means but the story
wasn’t that discrimination means comparing two people, treating similar people
differently. For fundamental alteration you said you were going to make up this
defense that if they had a plan and if they were moving people at a reasonable pace
that’s good enough, even though that appears nowhere in the statute. And the
deference to the treatment professionals is in a completely different provision of
the statute that has nothing to do with this case. But you are sort of pulling stuff
from everywhere. This is what lawyering is. To any of the students in the audience,
don’t let anyone tell you that lawyering is just what Justice Scalia said lawyering
is. You have to appeal to multiple kinds of justices and sometimes you pull stuff
from a bunch of different places and you get to the median justice and get the
results. So, in light of that, and obviously foreshadowing that Irv was a better
predictor than his colleagues in the SG’s office about this: Was there anything that
surprised either of you, Mike or Irv, about the argument or the decision?
MICHAEL GOTTESMAN: Not big surprises. But there were a couple of things.
There was one place where we each divided. We each got the same question:
suppose the state had no group houses and the only thing they had were institutions,
does this require them to have group homes for those who did not need to be in the
institution? Not surprisingly, as I was representing the disability community, I said,
“Yes it does. The statute says you have to be served in the least restrictive way.
The regulation said the state doesn’t have to make fundamental alterations, but
building a group home is not what they meant as a fundamental alteration. Now,
the question was hypothetical because at this point there was no state that didn’t
have at least some group homes. It's not as if the question actually involved any
state. But hypothetically we would say that a state can’t just say, “Sorry we will
stick with institutions.”
The same question was asked of Irv and he said on behalf of the government,
“We think it would be a fundamental alteration to require a state to initiate group
homes when they never had one before.” And since, of course, he had invented
this whole planet as it has been described, they wanted to know what his view
about that was as well. Now they did not address that in the opinion.
The one other thing about the opinion that surprised me a bit is that the Court
embraced the government’s idea that states have to have a plan to claim a
fundamental alteration defense. One of the things we had argued is “Look at the
reason why Georgia is dragging its feet on moving people. These are reasons
totally unrelated to cost. Instead they are related to wanting to preserve jobs in the
institution.” It was a bit hard for me to make this argument as a union lawyer, but
I remembered who my client was. But, the administrators said there was some
evidence that the person who was head of one of the Georgia institutions said, “My
job is to make sure all the beds are full.” That showed that there were a lot of
motivations unrelated to what you would regard as legitimate concerns. In
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adopting the government’s proposed formula, the opinion did build that in, but
states are not allowed to consider institutional concerns unrelated to the treatment
of the patient in formulating your plan. So, we were very pleased with that.
IRV GORNSTEIN: As far as the argument went, I thought the questions that
came seemed like predictable questions to me. I knew the right side of the Court
was going to be on this discrimination business. But the thing was, they focused
on that while Mike was on. And by the time I got up, I can't even remember, maybe
they did ask me about it. But I always felt we had a very strong response, if you
were not stuck in the world of how you usually think about discrimination because
as Mike said, we were armed with the findings that basically said that segregation
in the form of institutionalization is discrimination. And so, the statute can say
black is white and it is white. It can certainly say that something like segregation
which has a lineage in discrimination law and in racial segregation is
discrimination. It is true discrimination usually involves dissimilar treatment of
persons who are similarly situated, but the way we structured the brief, as Mike
said, we had provided a backup argument.
The main argument was that this is just how Congress defined discrimination:
segregation in the form of unnecessary institutionalization is discrimination. But
underneath that, I had an argument about why Congress considered this as
discrimination. That included or embraced a kind of dissimilar treatment argument
which was, that (a) nondisabled people could get medical services in the
community whereas disabled people could not; and (b) if you think about all the
other services that states had a duty to provide equally to disabled and nondisabled
people, like parks and libraries or anything else like that; the effect of
institutionalization was to deprive these disabled persons of access to those public
services and not deprive nondisabled persons.
So, we did have that. Not as the main argument but just as one or two of the
reasons that Congress thought about this as discrimination. We also had the idea
that segregation stigmatizes and that is a form of discrimination that has been
recognized. Segregation stigmatizes disabled persons as not being able to live in
the community or not fit to live in the community, and you are not doing that to
nondisabled persons. So, in each case underneath the idea that Congress had just
identified unnecessary institutionalization as discrimination, I felt very good about
all of those arguments. So, I was not at all worried. I figured that—because I had
been through two moot courts—I was not going to persuade anybody who was not
already persuaded by it. But I knew we were on firm ground. So, I did not feel
weak. I don’t remember, I may have gotten one of those questions. But not much.
One of the questions I did get was the community placement question: whether a
state that did not offer community place had to establish a community placement
program.
As to that, the Justice Department had already taken a position before I ever
got into this case. The DOJ’s position was that it would be a fundamental alteration
to require the state to offer community services if they had not before. So when I
was doing the brief, I thought we had two choices. First, we could back off of what
we had said before, which is never going to win you any friends, but, if you have
to, then you do it. My thinking was that everybody already had community
services, so it was low-cost to say “yes, it's a fundamental alteration, but in the real
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world that is not going to matter at all because everybody already has community
services.” So that seemed like a cost-free concession to me and because we had
already taken that position, I didn't want to undo it. Because that costs you
credibility when you back away from a position the government has been taking.
And the other main question I anticipated I would get, because I got it over
and over again at the moot courts, was “What if somebody needs one-on-one
treatment? Does the state have to provide that to everybody?” In the moot courts I
went back and forth on how to answer that particular question. I ended up deciding
and basically planning to say that this was not a fundamental alteration question,
it's a question about whether it's unreasonably costly, which we had actually
separated out from fundamental alteration. Unreasonable cost would have made it
an unreasonable change in policy. That’s not actually how the Court ended up
thinking about it, but that's how we were thinking about it at the time. And so I
said that is just a question about whether it’s unreasonable cost. I told them that
there was a statute that wasn't in this part of the ADA but a different part of the
ADA that talked about when costs are unreasonable.
MIKE GOTTESMAN: It's in Title III.
IRV GORNSTEIN: I said to them to take a look at Title III, this would tell you
the kind of factors to consider in deciding whether the costs are unreasonable. I
was not going to give them an answer because I was not aware of all the facts on
the ground, but that would have been the inquiry and they were fine with that. I
actually thought the argument had gone reasonably well. I mean, Justice Breyer
was all over Mike with the dumping problem.
MICHAEL GOTTESMAN: Yes. And Justice O'Connor on what are the burdens
on the state.
IRV GORNSTEIN: The other thing I remember, of course, is that right side
justices want to tell you there is no room in the statute to do anything reasonable—
“Where is it in the statute that you can take the professional judgment of the state
into account? That is not in the statute.” Of course, their goal is not to say they
should not defer to it, the goal is to say there should not have been this obligation
at all. And I did get asked that question too and I gave my Arline answer and that
seemed to be fine. I was only looking at Breyer and O'Connor, and it seemed to be
fine with them. I knew it would not satisfy the rest of the right side of Court.
MICHAEL GOTTESMAN: There was no hope going in of getting the votes of
Justices Scalia, Thomas, or Rehnquist—that was a nonstarter. We anticipated
getting questions from them on this issue of discrimination because they wanted
to end the case there. They were not asking, as a practical matter, about how
burdensome this would be to the state. They were just all over this issue of whether
it's discrimination to keep people in an institution. One other thing we had done to
appeal to the left or middle of the Court was to ask why these people were in
institutions to begin with. The answer was that it was the result of a long history
of real discrimination, wanting to get these people out of the community, hide them
in institutions. Georgia of course was all wrapped up with the eugenics movement,
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and indeed still had laws about this in the 1970s. That really is at its root of the
discrimination that created this problem in the first place. Why didn’t they think of
community homes in the first place? Because they wanted to get these people out
of the community. And we suggested that that may, in addition to the concerns of
the unions and the people, be something some people in the state would still be
thinking about. And obviously there is no room for that under the ADA. So that
was why it was very helpful that the majority opinion said that you cannot take
account of any of these other considerations in formulating your plan. The only
thing you are supposed to be thinking about is how can we feasibly and at an
appropriately rapid pace move people from institutions to the community?
One of the problems we had specific to this case—and the Court dealt with it
in its opinion—was, assuming the state has a limited number of openings at the
moment in community based settings, why should it be the people that bring the
lawsuit who get those slots? Or should people who have been there even longer
than them and have been certified by the professional staff as appropriate for
movement be the ones to get those slots? Why should it be only the people who
brought a lawsuit? Should the state have some type of waiting list of priority? The
Court dealt with this in its opinion. It said that the plan was supposed to address
this too. The plan for the state is supposed to have a waiting list and move people
off of it so that whoever brings a lawsuit doesn't affect who gets into the
community first.
JENNIFER MATHIS: I would just point out that this “fundamental alteration”
defense was injected into the integration mandate because of the creative lawyering
on the part of folks in Pennsylvania who had litigated Helen L. The integration
regulation doesn't say anything about fundamental alteration or cost. The thinking
was if we just go to the court to say the integration regulation means that you have
to serve people in the most integrated setting, always, period, end of the story, then
there is no way we were ever going to win and there needed to be some kind of
limiting principle, some kind of way of cabining the obligation. So, the
fundamental alteration regulation was read into the complaint in the first place.
And I think the other plaintiffs followed suit. And sometimes people have said to
me: Why is fundamental alteration in there anyway? It doesn't belong, it's not part
of the integration regulation. Query whether we would be where we are if the
strategy was not to incorporate some kind of defense.
IRV GORNSTEIN: I had that problem at the outset when I read the regulation . .
. I thought there was this regulation which talks about reasonable modifications
and no fundamental alterations. And then later comes the integration regulation,
that doesn't say, “subject to this other regulation there’s an integration duty.”
Instead, it just describes an integration duty and I always felt like this was an
analytical problem. I never thought this was going to be a practical problem
because I was just going to tell them this is how we interpreted it. And I can't
remember if Auer v. Robbins12 had been decided yet.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: About two years before.
12. 519 U.S. 452 (1997).
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IRV GORNSTEIN: The bigger problem, which I haven’t mentioned at all, and it
was a part of my argument, was the question of whether we would get Chevron
deference, which is another modern issue. Back then, the problem was that Justice
Scalia didn't think we were entitled to Chevron deference because he had said so
in the last ADA case and Justice Kennedy wrote an opinion in that other case that
was ambiguous on whether there was Chevron deference. And the problem is that,
in Justice Scalia's view, for those of you who are not familiar with Chevron
deference, it's the agency who is responsible for administrating an act. The
agency’s interpretation of the statute is entitled to respect as long as it is reasonable,
and as long as the statute was ambiguous. I knew this was going to be an uphill
struggle on Chevron. I wanted to argue the case, at least in the argument, solely on
the statute and just forget about Chevron deference. That was my plan in argument,
but of course right at the beginning of my argument Justice Scalia wanted to get
into an argument about whether there was Chevron deference. Of course, I had to
defend our position that there was. And the reason he didn’t think there was is that
just because you get authority to write regulations doesn't mean you get Chevron
deference. You actually have to have adjudicative authority. And the Department
of Justice did not have any authority to adjudicate violations. So probably the first
five minutes of my ten minutes was spent thinking, “I really don't want to talk
about this, but if you make me talk about it I will.” And just as I was ready to move
on—I told them my view, that some earlier case had settled it in our favor—Justice
Kennedy, who had written the decision, said, “Wait a minute, now, I wrote that
decision and I don’t think that’s what I said.”
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: But that's exactly what Justice Kennedy said! It was
Bragdon v. Abbott. 13 He said: “Because the justice department has regulatory
authority, it is entitled to deference. See Chevron.” But then the next year they
totally forgot it.
MICHAEL GOTTESMAN: My view on this was that the Justice Department did
not have deference. Instead, they had to adopt the Rehab regulation 14 which
already said this thing. So, we didn’t get into it in our brief at all. And they didn’t
ask me questions because it was much more entertaining to ask the government
these questions. But our view was that thinking about deference, this is not the
typical kind of case. You rarely see a case that Congress on the face of the statute
says you shall adopt these regulations. So, you know, the regulation they adopted
is the one that the Congress told them to. It is as if Congress incorporated the
regulation into this statute.

13. 519 U.S. 624 (1998).
14. The ADA directed the government to adopt regulations consistent with certain existing regulations
implementing Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act, including a regulation requiring covered entities to
“administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
handicapped persons.” 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d). This legislative direction to use the "most integrated setting"
regulations promulgated under the Rehabilitation Act informed the Olmstead court's analysis of the
integration mandate. See Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581, 591–92 (1999).
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SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: Let me turn back to you, Jennifer. When the decision
came out, it basically followed the lines that people have been talking about just
now. Justice Ginsburg wrote the decision for the Court, which said people whose
treating professionals find they can handle and benefit from community-based
services, but are not getting them, then they have at least a presumptive right to be
served in the community subject to this fundamental alteration defense. And the
state establishes a “plan defense” if it has a plan to move people at a reasonable
pace into community-based settings and the pace is not controlled by its desire to
keep institutions fully populated.
Kennedy concurs only in the judgment and says, in a part joined by Breyer,
“We have to be really concerned about not de-institutionalizing too fast because
people will die,” essentially. Thomas dissented.
Jennifer, when you read that opinion, as someone in the disability community
who had sort of brought all of these people in and had been thinking about this
case as the test of this new theory, what did you think?
JENNIFER MATHIS: I thought this could really play out so many different ways.
This “fundamental alteration defense” as they have articulated it, could potentially
swallow up the Olmstead case.15 It was very unclear what they were going to do
with this. And I remember that, in the early days after Olmstead when we were
going around speaking about what the decision meant, I had a conversation with
Ira Burnim, our legal director, about what I was going to say and as soon as I said,
“Well, you know there are all these questions and it’s sort of unclear how this plan
defense will play out and what that means.” He said: “Do not say that! We do not
want that to be out there. We have to control the narrative about what this means.
It’s very important that people be careful on pieces of paper and what they say
about how we interpret this, how we think it will be interpreted.”
After that, I would say I was pretty careful to make sure that all those
expressions of uncertainty didn't get out there. What we did do, since we didn't
know what this plan defense would mean, was have a big convening shortly after
the decision came down. I think you, Mike, were there. We all ended up agreeing
we would give it one year to see what would happen. Nobody wanted to file a case
right away, and get a decision saying “Well, they have a plan” or “They are
working on a plan and you lose because they are working on a plan.”
And so, we decided to give it one year and if by the time a year goes by and
they have a plan, then we will see what it looks like and assess the viability of
claims. If they don't have a plan after a year, then we thought we were going to be
on pretty good footing with any “plan” defense. We waited for what felt like a long
time, with everyone focused on plans and with what these plans were going to look
like.
The plans turned out to be nothing spectacular. They tended to be pieces of
paper that were very generic and recitations of all the good work states have
already done in this general direction. But they were not concrete about when or
what they would do in the future and how they would move people and how it
would happen or be financed or anything like that. After a while, we sort of moved
past plans. But that was the initial phase: the uncertainty, and cautious optimism,
15. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
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but with this whole fixation on plans. I think if you look at how we think about
Olmstead now, it's far, far less focused on this whole planning process.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: So that’s the next question. How do you think about
Olmstead now? Olmstead started in your hands and those of people like you shortly
after, and then became a much more aggressive tool in expanding communitybased services. Talk about how that happened.
JENNIFER MATHIS: I think we are in a very different place now. The law has
developed well. That’s not to say that the world has developed as well. But the law
has had a very significant impact on how state service systems think about people
with disabilities, talk about people with disabilities, and treat people with
disabilities. We certainly have had a lot of evolution since the decision came down.
You know, a big piece of that frankly was DOJ’s decision to get involved. Because
of Sam coming in and making it a top priority.
For years we were litigating about preliminary issues and there were a lot of
“reverse Olmstead” cases as we called them. These cases asked, “does Olmstead
give you a right to stay in the institution if you want to do that?” This came up
when there were plans to close institutions or transition folks. We didn't really get
to the meat of what Olmstead meant in most of the cases. It did not happen for
another almost ten years.
So then, in 2009 and 2010, the Justice Department started litigating these
cases. They started investigations. They started negotiating. They entered
settlements. And I think the way that states perceived their obligations changed
after that. I remember going to early meetings with state folks where it was very
clear that they did not think Olmstead necessarily meant a whole lot. They certainly
did not think it meant anything like what we thought it meant in the earlier days.
And then come 2011 and 2012, it was a very different picture. While I say it hasn't
changed the world, as much as it might or should or could, it certainly has changed
the goals and expectations of service systems.
The reason Olmstead hasn't changed the world as much as it might have is that
it turns out to be really, really hard work to transform service systems that have
operated a certain way with a certain set of presumptions for decades. We win
cases, we enter settlement agreements that have good and strong provisions and
strong obligations, and yet it turns out to be really hard to get every level of the
system—from reviews and assessments of people in institutions, to service
providers, and more—to change. Systems have typically operated for so many
years with the premise that if you look like this, you belong in a place like this, or
if you look like that, you belong in a place like that. And there is often a belief that
systems operate along a linear continuum where you move from one setting to
another setting, to another setting, and you have to prove yourself so you can
graduate from each setting, and in one hundred years you graduate from being in
an institution to being in your own apartment. The work of undoing those attitudes
is really a long haul.
But Olmstead was hugely significant in giving us the foundation for that,
giving us the tools. It is hard work actually implementing those tools and
maximizing them. Things have also shifted in terms of how people see Olmstead’s
application. In the beginning, people thought it was about state hospitals and state
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institutions, but that was it. Then we brought a case against New York that was an
Olmstead case challenging the state’s reliance on private institutions (which is
increasingly the case, as the states’ service systems have relied more on private
providers rather than running their own facilities). We said the basis for the claim
is not the actions of the private institutions—they’re not discriminating under the
integration mandate. Rather, it’s the state that is planning and funding and
administering a system that looks like this and that gives people only the “choice”
to live in an institution and not the choice to live in their own home. That and other
similar cases that followed certainly shifted what Olmstead meant to people. When
we first brought that case, many people were skeptical and thought Olmstead didn’t
apply in that circumstance. Now, of course, everybody thinks it does.
Now you have evolving understandings of the integration mandate, as other
folks have suggested earlier in this conference, and it has been applied to
employment and education and criminal justice systems and pretty much
everything that Title II applies to, meaning state and local government services.
So, the understanding of the law really is, always evolving and always changing
and that is sort of the gift of the ADA. In some ways it's such a broad statute and
there are so many applications of it that people had not really anticipated or thought
deeply about before. You are always discovering. You can go back and develop
new law. It really is just a critical foundation and has evolved in ways that really
weren't specifically anticipated that are really positive.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: I think if the justices, the five justices who voted for
Lois Curtis and Elaine Wilson, knew what would happen, they might not have all
voted the same way. Certainly Justice O'Connor might have had some questions.
To me, the crucial move was thinking about the administration of the state
service system as something that has to be done in the most integrated setting. That
came in the New York adult homes case which was the first really big successful
systemic Olmstead case. There were some others that had some more mixed
success before that.
Then also Steve Gold, whom you mentioned before, was going around the
country challenging various Medicaid rules that subtly forced people into nursing
homes, for instance, a rule that said, “we will cover more prescription drugs for
people in nursing homes than we will cover outside of nursing homes under
Medicaid.” And that would move people into the nursing homes. Those cases
started to get some success. And then there was a wave of cases in the Great
Recession when states had massive budget problems and were cutting their
Medicaid budgets—because Medicaid is a fifth of the average state’s budget. The
only thing they could cut was community-based services. So, you had a bunch of
folks—including both the disability rights groups and the labor unions that were
representing workers who were supporting people with disabilities in the
community—who went to court.
You started to see all these ways in which Olmstead could be used as a general
tool to challenge rules adopted by states that led to segregation. And then it sort of
exploded from there. That was certainly when the Obama administration took this
on as a project. That was the way we thought about it: let's find all the places this
works and use the bully pulpit of the United States to get states to change and
maybe that will work.
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All right. Any questions? I know this is a whole lot of ground we covered.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I was a mother of a man with significant disabilities. I
know thousands of people who are family members around the country. I was in
the Clinton administration and the Obama administration. The problem is this:
When there is a state plan, the family of a person with a disability is trapped forever
in the state where they get the support. So, a young family can't move to take a job
opportunity. And a retirement age family cannot move to retire to warmer place.
And, worst, the family typically thinks, when we die then our son or daughter will
move to live with their sister in a different state, and they can't. Is there any way
to use Olmstead to get at interstate portability?
MICHAEL GOTTESMAN: So, the problem of moving is if they go to the other
state, they go back to the waiting list.
JENNIFER MATHIS: And you’re not eligible for Medicaid right away.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: A lot of this has to do with the ridiculous way we do
healthcare in this country. And the way Medicaid was constructed on a state-bystate basis. I know this is a problem. I hear this from a lot of people. I have a
number of close friends who are stuck and have all kinds of reasons why they really
need to move and cannot move. And I also have had folks who have dealt with the
issue of dying parents. The problem is everyone else on the waiting list has a claim
to an integrated service too. So, there might be opportunities to use Olmstead for
this, but I think it is a hard argument under Olmstead to do that. It is really a major
problem.
JENNIFER MATHIS: I remember there was legislation that was contemplated,
but I don't know if it was ever introduced.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: Also, community-based services under waivers, not just
HCBS waivers. But all kinds of waivers. So, each state has different waivers and
has different services, so I think it's really hard.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: I know it's a huge problem.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I don’t have a question, but a comment about the
argument. I took [a class of students] to the argument. That year I had a deaf student
in my class. I wrote the marshal to say, “We would like to come to the argument
and will bring a sign language interpreter, just want to let you know.” The marshal
said, “That's fine, that's terrific, we can accommodate you.”
So, I went to the argument and I was sitting in the Supreme Court bar section
and my students were in the back. After the argument we reconnected to say,
“What did you think?” The interpreter said, “I'm outraged what happened here.” I
said, “What do you mean?”
The interpreter said, “Well I situated myself with the student to whom I was
providing interpretation and immediately the marshals came over and said you
cannot sit with your back to the court.” Which is how she wanted to sit in order to
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sign. The marshal said they were concerned sitting in that way would either distract
the Court or it would create a security problem. I think they had some thought that
maybe by signing that the interpreter was going to be all over the place. In any
event they made her sit to the side which meant the student had to keep looking to
her and then also looking at the Court which is very inconvenient.
So she told me about this. The next thing she did she didn't tell me, but I learned
about later. She wrote a letter to each justice of the Court to complain about the
way her client was treated and the irony of this being in an argument about access
of people with disabilities. And I got a call later in the week from the marshal
saying, “What went on? I thought we took care of this.” And I said, “I thought we
did too but apparently this is what happened.” But the marshal said that it was
coming up at conference on Friday for the justices to talk about this. Also, that day,
that Thursday, Justice Breyer called one of my colleagues, who was a friend of his,
and said “What happened with your students at this argument?” Anyway, that
happened, and as far as I know the justices never responded to the interpreter. I
think the marshals thought they were accommodating. But, as we talked about
today, perspectives on whether you are being appropriately accommodated depend
on your circumstance.
AUDIENCE QUESTION: I am a student here at Georgetown. And my question is
more of a basic functional question as to how Olmstead works in the courts today.
That New York adult homes case almost sounded like a systemic class action case
seeking injunctive relief. But, how are Olmstead claims being brought in courts
today? When Olmstead cases are brought in the courts, what are the remedies they
are asking for now?
JENNIFER MATHIS: That is a great question, I think in part because of the way
the fundamental alteration defense has been articulated and interpreted, you almost
have to bring these as systemic cases rather than as individual Olmstead cases. We
have brought individual Olmstead cases in specific circumstances. Typically, it's
either a class action case or a case with an associational plaintiff and you’re talking
about a sizable amount of folks where you can achieve cost savings or be cost
neutral if you develop community services for folks and close down institutional
beds behind them.
The remedies, typically, involve a multiyear process. It's a plan basically. A
plan to transition folks out of institutions; the plan has goals and typically annual
goals, benchmarks, that the state is agreeing to meet. There are some parameters.
I think one of the things that we always look for more than anything else are some
parameters on the assessment process because if you don't dictate something about
how the assessments of people are conducted—assessments of where people
should live or what the most integrated setting is, where people should be educated,
whatever the context is—if you don’t define how those assessments have to work,
then they will work the way they always worked and nobody will get out, nobody's
services will change. There are a lot of different components and I think there are
a couple of basic formulas that the settlement agreements tend to fall into. Justice
Department has a model. We have a model. There are others in the middle. But,
really, it's a multiyear plan with somebody overseeing the process, usually a court
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monitor, because judges are not going to be able to figure out all this stuff
themselves.
SAMUEL BAGENSTOS: At DOJ, mostly drawing from the experience that folks
like the Bazelon Center had, we kind of developed this model of the settlement
agreement identifying who is the targeted class of people that will get services. For
instance, people with severe mental illness who are in or at risk of being placed in
state psychiatric hospital or nursing home or something. It would depend on the
case.
We would usually say, “There are 10,000 people in this class and in year one
you will create 800 new supported housing slots plus a certain number of
community treatment teams, and you will do things to make sure those work. And
you will have a new assessment process so that when people are moving out, you
are actually making good assessments. And we are going to have a court monitor
who will review the whole thing.”
I always like having numbers as the benchmark. If you could agree on the
numbers ahead of time, then it wasn't like a court making its own decision about
what the numbers would be, but plaintiffs and defendants would work it out. And
you’d usually have a lot of arguments in the negotiations about how many people
actually can move out and about how quickly they can do it and how do you do it.
That was sort of the model that we always followed.

